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A Human Rights Perspective on 
Professional Responsibility  
in Global Corporate Practice 
David Nersessian, JD, PhD* 
The direct applicability of human rights law to the 
attorney-client relationship has serious implications for ethical 
corporate governance. In addition to creating criminal and civil 
risks for lawyer and client alike, the specter of human rights 
violations in business dealings gives rise to myriad ethical 
questions for corporate lawyers to consider and resolve. These 
include matters such as the legitimate object and scope of 
corporate representation, conflicts of interest, duties to 
withdraw, and matters of competence and communication in 
corporate governance. They also raise questions of professional 
secrecy and whether ethical codes permit (or even require) 
lawyers to reveal confidential information, either to prevent 
harm or to protect the corporate client from its own malfeasant 
employees. These ethical concerns also affect supervisory 
relationships and duties to report misconduct by other lawyers. 
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I. Introduction 
The interplay between business and human rights presents a 
complex set of challenges for corporate lawyers. As business becomes 
increasingly global, often through a lengthening supply chain and a 
widening range of outsourced functions, the risk of a corporation 
directly or indirectly violating human rights continues to grow as 
 
* Associate Professor, Accounting and Law Division, Babson College. The 
author is grateful for thoughtful perspectives shared at the conference 
for which this symposium article was drafted: Corporations on Trial: 
International Criminal and Civil Liability for Corporations for Human 
Rights Violations, held at the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Sept. 17, 2017. 
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well.1 The international community continues to debate the optimal 
intersection of business and human rights; although some consensus 
exists,2 many of the norms in question have yet to develop into firm 
rules of international law.3  
Corporate lawyers can play a key role in this area by working 
with business clients to develop standards and appropriate compliance 
frameworks to address the unique global risks that human rights 
present to the business sector. But certain risks for lawyers have 
grown as well, and corporate counsel increasingly must manage new 
and shifting dimensions of ethical risk as they practice law in rapidly-
globalizing business environments. This includes not only personal 
hazards (an individual lawyer’s compliance with ethical rules) but also 
ethical risks at the enterprise level for organizations – law firms and 
legal departments – that serve clients in this area.  
II. Corporate Lawyers and Human Rights 
At the outset, it is worth noting an important parallel between 
legal ethics and human rights law. Like the principles underlying 
human rights, the professional frameworks governing lawyers reflect a 
mixture of normative value statements and pragmatic conduct 
regulation. The ABA Model Rules4 and similar codes5 juxtapose the 
 
1. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (detailing 
the range of issues presented, including human rights standards and 
responsibilities of transnational corporations). 
2. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. No. 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011); see also Human Rights Council Res. 
17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at ¶¶ 6, 
13, 15 (Jul. 6, 2011) (adopting the Guiding Principles and establishing 
an ongoing working group to disseminate the standards and assess their 
effectiveness). 
3. See, e.g., Guillaume Long, Chair-Rapporteur, Draft report on the third 
session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights, Third session of the open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights, Oct. 23-27, 2017, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session3/P
ages/Session3.aspx [https://perma.cc/D328-UWTZ] (discussing 
proposals on a draft instrument to regulate activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises). 
4. This writing draws extensively on the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been widely adopted 
(albeit with some variation) throughout the United States. See MODEL 
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profession’s highest aspirations with detailed requirements on how law 
must be practiced. The legal profession “operationalizes” ethics 
through a self-regulatory regime incorporating the traditional 
compliance strategies of bounded professional discretion, safe harbors, 
and significant penalties for breach. 
Although human rights encompass a wide range of human 
endeavors and issues, this article focuses more narrowly on the unique 
implications of serious human rights violations for corporate 
practitioners – the collateral impacts on the ethical regulation of 
lawyers in private practice. It argues that human rights law directly 
impacts the attorney-client relationship. Human rights violations thus 
subject corporate lawyers to a set of liability risks that do not exist 
for other corporate officers and employees: the potential for 
disciplinary sanctions arising out of breaches of the rules of 
professional conduct governing the legal profession. 
At the outset, it is important to note that corporate lawyers are 
hardly the only legal practitioners interacting with human rights. 
Government lawyers arguably have far more regularized day-to-day 
interaction with human rights issues.7 Indeed, the most high-profile 
examples of lawyers becoming embroiled in human rights violations 
have involved government attorneys.  
The most notorious example is that of the Nazi lawyers who 
contributed to genocide and other human rights violations in the 
 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES]. 
5. Although the Model Rules are useful for analytic purposes, they by no 
means are the final word on ethical questions. Every state and foreign 
country has its own ethical regime governing its lawyers and regulating 
interactions with other disciplinary systems. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 
8.5 cmt. 7 (applying choice of law provisions to “transnational practice” 
by American lawyers); see also Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the 
European Union Rule 1.5 (specifying that lawyers must follow the EU’s 
transnational practice rules as well as the requirements of their home 
jurisdictions). 
7. Some have described, for example, the “loose network of lawyers across 
a number of government agencies who together provide legal advice on 
the most sensitive issues to military and civilian decision makers, their 
focus being on U.S. domestic and international legal obligations.” See 
David Kaye, The Legal Bureaucracy and the Law of War, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 589, 592 (2006) (detailing the intersecting and 
overlapping roles of lawyers in the Department of Defense, the State 
Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, the legal adviser to the 
National Security Council, the Office of Legal Counsel at the 
Department of Justice, and White House and vice presidential lawyers 
and noting that “[d]uring the armed conflicts since 9/11, all five of these 
organizations have given legal advice.”). 
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Third Reich.6 More recently, the so-called “torture memos” drafted by 
White House lawyers implicated serious human rights issues. These 
memos authorized severe interrogation policies toward detainees, 
applying a highly questionable definition of torture.7 There has been 
vigorous debate over whether these memoranda authorized torture in 
violation of international law or violated the professional obligations 
of their authors.8 Although the Justice Department’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility determined that the authors committed 
professional misconduct by failing to provide competent, objective, 
and comprehensive advice,9 the OPR’s findings were overturned on 
the grounds that OPR had failed to identify any meaningful standard 
against which to assess the legal analysis provided.10 The role of the 
 
6. See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, The Prosecution of Josef Altstoetter et al.: 
Law, Lawyers and Justice in the Third Reich, 16 PENN STATE INT’L L. 
REV. 343 (1998) (discussing human rights violations by Nazi lawyers in 
the Third Reich). 
7. The memoranda are reproduced and analyzed in THE TORTURE MEMOS: 
RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (David Cole, ed., 2009). For a 
detailed analysis of legal and factual issues, see PHILIPPE SANDS, 
TORTURE TEAM – RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN 
VALUES (2008).  
8. Compare Jordan J. Paust, International Crimes Within the White 
House, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 339 (2007) (arguing that memoranda and 
numerous other administration policies violated international law), and 
Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 347, 368 (2007) (arguing that torture memo was “arguably 
criminal” and “[a]t a minimum . . . [the authors] were reckless as to the 
commission of acts of torture and appeared to outright encourage the 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees by U.S. 
interrogators.”), with Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous 
Campaign to Criminalize Good Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 449, 454 (2009), and Eric Posner & Adrien Vermeule, A 
‘Torture’ Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, Wall St. J., July 6, 2004, at 
A22 (suggesting that memoranda authors “provided reasonable legal 
advice and no more, trusting that their political superiors would make 
the right call.”). 
9. See Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Dep’t of Justice, Report: 
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning 
Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 251, 255 (2009) 
[hereinafter “OPR Memo”], available at https://www.aclu.org/files/ 
pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_201007
19_declassifications.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GXA-QYVK] (determining 
that authors committed professional misconduct by failing to provide 
competent, objective, and comprehensive advice). 
10. See Department of Justice, Memorandum of Decision Regarding 
Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of 
Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of 
Legal Counsel’s Memorandum Concerning Issues Relating to the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on 
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government lawyers in this context has been studied extensively in 
scholarship addressing criminal11 and civil12 liability, legal ethics,13 
moral wrongfulness,14 social science,15 prosecution in overseas 
jurisdictions,16 and the domestic17 and foreign18 policies of the United 
States, and there remains little to add to that debate. 
The role of government lawyers differs sharply in many respects 
from that of corporate counsel operating in the private sector. Judicial 
officials and prosecutors, for example, have duties extending beyond 
 
Suspected Terrorists, Jan. 5, 2010 [hereinafter DOJ Memo], available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20100105_DAG_
Margolis_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPD5-ESH7]; see also David D. 
Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report, 4 
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455 (2010) (detailing the Office of 
Professional Responsibility investigation and Margolis review). 
11. See, e.g., Markovic, supra note 9 (discussing ways in which lawyers 
might become implicated in war crimes). 
12. See, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 715 (2006) (analyzing the potential liability of the United States 
and its officials for torture under current domestic law). 
13. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 175 (2006) (considering strained interpretations of international law 
by authors of the torture memos). 
14. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005) (analyzing lawyer advice on 
torture). 
15. See, e.g., Keith A. Petty, Professional Responsibility Compliance and 
National Security Attorneys: Adopting the Normative Framework of 
Internalized Legal Ethics, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1563 (2011) (proposing use of 
social science compliance theory to address ethical failures of 
governmental legal advisors as a means of both better understanding 
prior ethical lapses and ensuring ethical adherence prospectively). 
16. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, Prosecuting Guantanamo in Europe: Can and 
Shall the Masterminds of the “Torture Memos” Be Held Criminally 
Responsible on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction?, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 405 (2009) (assessing the potential for criminal prosecution of 
lawyers in Belgium, Spain, and Germany). 
17. See, e.g., Wayne Sandholtz, Closing Off the Torture Option, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 589 (2009) (discussing role of executive orders in 
domestic torture policy); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush 
Administration and International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too 
Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57 (2009) 
(evaluating the Bush Administration’s overall approach to international 
law and diplomatic relations). 
18. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Wolfgang Friedmann Lecture: A 
World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641 (2005) 
(addressing the illegality of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and the scope of the president’s constitutional authority in 
this realm). 
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merely facilitating the government’s interest in advocacy and other 
settings.19 Special rules that aim to account for the public’s interest in 
legal work,20 as well as additional specialized rules of practice for 
certain governmental agencies, reflect these obligations.21 
Government lawyers also have differing obligations to the 
organizational client itself.22 Indeed, it can be difficult to sort out the 
actual identity of the lawyer’s “client” in the first place. Although – 
like corporate lawyers – government lawyers represent an abstract 
entity with legal personality, serious questions can arise about which 
of multiple interlocking entities is the “real” client (for corporate 
lawyers, subsidiary, parent, or both, versus branch office or division of 
the US Attorney’s office, the Department of Justice, or the United 
States government as a whole for government lawyers).23 Government 
lawyers have broader “responsibilities and obligations of loyalty that 
go beyond those of private attorneys . . . [to encompass] the American 
public and its collective interests and values.”24 They also face far 
greater political repercussions and concerns about external influence 
in legal matters than private sector attorneys, particularly when 
 
19. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (a government 
lawyer “is representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it should win a case, but that justice 
shall be done . . . .”). 
20. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 1.11 (special duties of current and former 
government officers and employees) and r. 3.8 (special responsibilities of 
prosecutors). 
21. See, e.g., DOJ Memo, supra note 11, at 11 (the Department of Justice 
Office of Professional Responsibility “finds professional misconduct when 
an attorney intentionally violates or acts in reckless disregard of a 
known, unambiguous obligation imposed by law, rule of professional 
conduct, or Department regulation or policy”), quoting OPR Memo, 
supra note 10, at 18. It also uses a preponderance evidentiary standard, 
in contrast to the clear and convincing standard typically employed by 
bar disciplinary authorities. Id. 
22. See MODEL RULES r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (in assessing a lawyer’s obligations 
under Rule 1.13, “when the client is a governmental organization, a 
different balance may be appropriate . . . for public business is 
involved.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 97 (2000) (“Representing a Government Client”) and ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-405 (1997) 
(“Conflicts in Representing Government Entities”). 
23. See MODEL RULES r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (detailing attorney’s duties to 
governmental clients). 
24. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers 
and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 693 (2004). 
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foreign relations are involved.25 Given these many differences, this 
article excludes public sector lawyers from further discussion here.  
The context in which corporate practitioners operate also bears 
consideration. Although this writing focuses on the ethical duties of 
corporate counsel, it does not distinguish between in-house versus 
external counsel and law firms. It focuses on ethical obligations 
stemming from the corporate legal work itself, rather than the setting 
in which lawyers perform it. This is not to say that there are not 
practical differences between in-house and outside counsel. In-house 
lawyers, for example, most likely would have greater access to 
information about the true nature of corporate transactions that 
violate human rights. They also may be more culpable by virtue of 
holding a position of greater influence over the company than outside 
lawyers. Significant legal consequences also may stem from a lawyer’s 
employment status, such as markedly different confidentiality 
protections for in-house versus outside lawyers between the United 
States and Europe.26 
In-house counsel also face liability in their capacity as members of 
senior management, where they often must meet more rigorous 
standards in corporate governance than non-lawyers.27 This turns on 
important – yet here extraneous – questions of whether the inside 
lawyer operated in a business capacity or a legal one. Despite their 
importance, this article puts aside such questions in favor of a sharper 
focus on the ethical implications of counsel’s work as legal advisor and 
facilitator. The various benefits,28 drawbacks,29 and special challenges30 
to lawyers who serve as corporate directors also are not discussed. 
 
25. Id. (noting that “foreign policy decisions are often highly political, and 
policymakers and others who influence policy are often skeptical 
concerning the relevance of international law.”). 
26. Compare Case No. C-550/07-P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros 
Chemicals v. European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-09301 (in-house 
communications “do not merit the protection afforded by legal 
professional privilege, no matter how often they are made, how highly 
significant they are or how useful they are to the undertaking.”), with 
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (attorney-client privilege 
protects communications conducted to facilitate legal advice to the 
company). 
27. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643, 690 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (lawyer-director who helps to draft a securities 
registration statement is required to conduct a more detailed inquiry 
than a non-lawyer director who is not involved in the drafting process). 
28. See Carolyn T. Thurston, Corporate Counsel on the Board of Directors: 
An Overview, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 792 (1980) (noting that lawyer-
directors enable the board “to consult the attorney before taking an 
action . . . [and to recognize] developing legal problems in their early 
stages” by providing the lawyer with access to the company’s conduct 
and affairs). 
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III. The Ethical Implications of Human Rights 
Violations 
This article now will consider three specific categories of ethical 
rules implicated by human rights violations. The first of these is the 
conflicts of interest that can arise when a corporate client violates 
human rights. These in turn relate to the legitimate object of legal 
representation and also implicate the lawyer’s obligation to withdraw 
from the representation. 
Second is the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. Does, for example, 
the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege apply to 
conduct that is illegal under international law? The article also 
discusses the role of human rights in broader duties of professional 
secrecy – whether those duties permit (or even require) lawyers to 
reveal confidential information, either to prevent crimes or serious 
injury or to protect a corporate client from its own malfeasant 
employees. 
Third, human rights have the potential to impact professional 
relationships existing between lawyers, which are governed by special 
ethical rules. Specifically, lawyers have duties to supervise other 
lawyers and non-lawyer professionals to ensure ethical compliance. 
They also must report ethical breaches by other attorneys to the 
appropriate disciplinary authorities. 
A. Conflicts of Interest and Mandatory Withdrawal 
Lawyers have a conflict of interest whenever “there is a significant 
risk that the representation . . . will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”31 Some conflicts can 
be waived, but only if the lawyer “reasonably believes that [counsel 
can] provide competent and diligent representation”32 and when “the 
representation is not prohibited by law.”33 
Neither standard is likely to be met here. Lawyers have an ethical 
duty to refrain from criminal conduct in their personal and 
 
29. See Lawyer-Directors are Key Targets for Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, ABA 
Group Told, 21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1272 (1989) (suggesting 
that lawyers who serve as directors must “be ‘certifiably nuts’ because 
of the likelihood of being sued.”). 
30. See ABA Op. 98-410, Lawyer Serving as Dir. of Client Corp. (allowing 
lawyers to serve as directors but noting significant challenges with 
conflicts of interest, confusion over the lawyer’s role, and the 
applicability of the attorney-client privilege).  
31. See MODEL RULES r. 1.7(a)(2). 
32. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(1). 
33. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(2). 
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professional lives. While this obligation does not cover every criminal 
act, disciplinary measures are warranted whenever conduct amounts 
to “serious crimes”34 or involves “moral turpitude.”35 Although the 
application of these concepts occasionally leads to questionable 
results,36 the violence and ill treatment inherent in human rights 
violations almost certainly qualifies as a “serious crime” and/or an 
offense of “moral turpitude.”37 Apart from policing their own conduct, 
lawyers also are expressly prohibited from helping their clients to 
commit crimes.38 
Engaging in or facilitating a client’s serious human rights 
violations thus creates two separate conflicts of interest for the 
corporate lawyer. First, the representation itself is “prohibited by 
 
34. See, e.g., VT. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (misconduct for lawyers to 
“engage in a ‘serious crime,’ defined as “illegal conduct involving any 
felony or involving any lesser crime [of dishonesty] . . . or an attempt or 
a conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a ‘serious crime.’”). 
35. South Carolina, for example, adds a prohibition on engaging in “conduct 
involving moral turpitude.”  See S.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 8.4. In 
Georgia, a lawyer violates 8.4 by being “convicted of a felony” or “a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct 
relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”  See GA. R. PROF. 
CONDUCT r. 8.4. Some states combine the concepts. See, e.g., TEX. R. 
PROF. CONDUCT r. 8.04(A)(2) (lawyers must not “commit a serious 
crime or commit any other criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects” and defining “serious crime” to include “any felony involving 
moral turpitude . . . .”). 
36. See, e.g., Grievance Administrator v. Carthew, Nos. 10-74-AI and 10-
81-JC (Mich. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. 2011) at 1, 5 (affirming 
suspension of 179 days, and thus allowing automatic reinstatement, for a 
lawyer pleading no contest to using a “computer to commit the crime of 
possession of child sexually abusive material” because the lawyer “did 
not intentionally seek pornographic materials involving minors”) and In 
re Grant, No. 09-C-12232 (CA State Bar Review Dep’t 2011) at pp. 2-3 
(determining that possession of child pornography is not moral 
turpitude per se, although actual or attempted child molestation is). 
37. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 art. 
5 (July 1, 2001) [hereinafter ICC Statute] (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes predicated on underlying conduct such as 
murder, cruel treatment, serious forms of discrimination, and the like) 
and art. 25(3)(a)-(c) (means of criminal perpetration); Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 arts. 1, 2 (acts of physical 
or mental torture). 
38. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 1.2(d) (prohibiting lawyer assistance in client 
crimes or fraud) and MODEL RULES r. 8.4(b) (providing that it is 
misconduct to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects”). 
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law” and thus unethical.39 Second, human rights violations create the 
specter of personal criminal liability for any lawyer who assists in 
their perpetration, such that the lawyer’s personal interests would 
impermissibly impact the representation.40 The Nuremberg progeny 
make very clear that lawyers and corporate officials are subject to 
individual criminal prosecution when legal frameworks41 or commercial 
endeavors42 become instruments of international crimes.43 This 
precedent remains valid today,44 and the International Criminal 
Court’s recent articulation of its willingness to investigate the role of 
corporate actors in international crimes45 certainly should give pause 
to both corporate officials and the lawyers who represent them.  
 
39. See MODEL RULES r. 1.2(d) (prohibition on assisting with illegal or 
fraudulent conduct) and MODEL RULES r. 1.7(b)(2) (lawyers may not 
represent a client if when the representation is “prohibited by law”). 
40. See MODEL RULES r. 1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation if there is risk 
of a conflict with a lawyer’s personal interests). 
41. See United States v. Alstötter, Case No. 3, Opinion and Judgment, 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
Volume III (U.S. Mil. Trib. April 1949) (prosecution of German judges 
and prosecutors); see also United States v. von Weizsaecker, Case No. 
11, Opinion and Judgment, Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Volume XIV (U.S. Mil. Trib. April 1949) 
(prosecution of Nazi government lawyers). 
42. See United States v. Krauch, Case No. 6, Opinion and Judgment, Trials 
of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Volume VIII 
(U.S. Mil. Trib. April 1948), United States v. Krupp, Case No. 6, 
Opinion and Judgment, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal Volume XI, at 1448 (U.S. Mil. Trib. April 1948), and 
United States v. Krupp, Case No. 5, Opinion and Judgment, Trials of 
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Volume VI 
(U.S. Mil. Trib. April 1947) (series of criminal cases brought against 
German industrialists). 
43. See, e.g., HoF’s Gravenhage [The Hague Court of Appeal], May 9, 2007, 
Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, No. LJN-BA4676 (Netherlands) (finding 
corporate executive who supplied chemical weapons materials to 
Saddam Hussein guilty of complicity in violations of the laws and 
customs of war). 
44. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 179 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“The universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by 
Nuremberg—rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane 
acts . . . —are the direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental 
norms recognized as jus cogens, from which no derogation is permitted, 
irrespective of the consent or practice of a given State.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
45. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY 
PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND PRIORITISATION 14 (2016) available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-
Selection_Eng.pdf [perma.cc/WA7S-F6QS] (noting that “the Office will 
give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that 
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This is not to suggest that the mere possibility of prosecuting 
corporate lawyers for international crimes makes such prosecution 
imminent. International prosecution cannot take place without 
sufficient pragmatic opportunity and political will on the part of the 
relevant actors to take an accused into custody in the first place. This 
is hardly a given,46 as demonstrated by the International Criminal 
Court’s inability to secure the arrest of Sudan’s president for 
egregious international crimes committed in Darfur.47 Nevertheless, 
the rapidly globalizing commercial environment suggests that 
corporate lawyers should at least consider the potential for criminal 
prosecution abroad. This holds true particularly in light of the ICC 
prosecutor’s power to initiate investigations on its own volition and 
the willingness of private parties (e.g., human rights NGOs) to bring 
matters to the ICC’s attention in the hope of prompting an 
investigation.48 
 
are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction 
of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the 
illegal dispossession of land.”). 
46. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, From Nazi Germany and Japan to Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda: Similarities and Differences, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 216-
17 (1997) (noting difficulty in obtaining custody of high level offenders 
in the former Yugoslavia, in contrast to Nazi officials following 
Germany’s military defeat in World War II). 
47. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. 02/05-01/09, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 92-93 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF [https://perma.cc/7DXP-
SB6L] (indicting Sudan’s president and commander-in-chief on charges 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity); see also Somini Sengupta, 
Omar al-Bashir Case Shows International Criminal Court’s Limitations, 
N.Y. Times (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/ 
16/world/africa/sudan-bashir-international-criminal-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YYE-RKXJ] (discussing case history and failure of 
other African states to arrest al-Bashir, despite the mandate from the 
ICC and UN Security council to do so). 
48. See, e.g., TENDAYI E. ACHIUME ET AL., COMMUNIQUÉ TO THE OFFICE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT UNDER 
ARTICLE 15 OF THE ROME STATUTE: THE SITUATION IN NAURU AND 
MANUS ISLAND: LIABILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, Feb. 14, 
2017, available at https://law.stanford.edu/publications/communique-
to-the-office-of-the-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court-under-
article-15-of-the-rome-statute-the-situation-in-nauru-and-manus-island-
liability-for-crimes-against-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/3HDD-AVJW] 
(group of law professors and NGOs requesting that the ICC prosecutor 
investigate public and corporate officials in Australia who allegedly 
committed the crimes against humanity of unlawful imprisonment, 
torture, deportation, persecution and other inhumane acts in the 
incarceration of refugees on Australia’s offshore detention centers on 
Nauru and in Papua New Guinea). 
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The risk of civil liability strikes closer to home in creating active 
conflicts of interest– both for corporate clients and the lawyers 
themselves. If they are directly involved in such conduct, lawyers 
could be sued civilly based on allegations that their legal work 
facilitated corporate human rights violations.  
Historically, many cases alleging human rights violations have 
been brought against corporations and individual corporate officers in 
US federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute.49 A conflict of interest 
could arise in an ATS case, for example, that alleges lawyer and client 
acted as joint tortfeasors with divergent litigation interests. Corporate 
defendants also could seek indemnity, relying on an “advice of 
counsel” defense, or assert malpractice claims that the lawyer’s 
incompetence exposed the company to ATS liability. Another context 
would involve governmental investigations into alleged wrongdoing.50 
Still more could arise from shareholder activism, where the lawyer is 
alleged to be complicit in the company’s human rights violations, or 
to have helped to misrepresent or conceal them, thus leading to 
inaccurate public filings and a negative impact on the company’s 
stock price. A lawyer’s involvement in a civil lawsuit involving a 
client also creates genuine questions about the “self-defense” 
exception51 to the ethical duty of confidentiality (discussed below).52 
And where potential claims ripen into actual litigation, the 
prohibition on lawyers serving as advocates and witnesses in the same 
proceeding applies as well.53 
 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-62) [hereinafter 
“ATS”]. For more, see generally DAVID NERSESSIAN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR 
JUDGES , 45-47 (2016) (collecting ATS cases brought against 
corporations). 
50. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F.Supp.2d 1296 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010) (ATS claims and shareholder litigation arising out payments 
of “protection” money to terrorist organization that extorted funds from 
local subsidiary). 
51. See MODEL RULES r. 1.6(b)(5) (outlining when a lawyer may reveal 
confidential information for self-defense reasons); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. C (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (exception enables lawyer “to defend against charges that 
imminently threaten the lawyer or the lawyer’s associate or agent with 
serious consequences, including criminal charges, claims of legal 
malpractice, and other civil actions” and includes credible threats as 
well as actual filings). 
52. See, e.g., Application of Friend, 411 F.Supp. 776, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(self-defense exception permitted disclosure of confidential client 
information to grand jury investigating alleged criminal conduct by 
lawyer and client). 
53. See MODEL RULES r. 3.7 (limitations on lawyer serving as an advocate 
when the lawyer also may be called upon to testify as a witness). 
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Recent trends in federal courts limiting ATS liability may reduce 
the volume of cases but cannot eliminate the underlying risks. While 
the Supreme Court narrowed the gateway in 2013, ATS jurisdiction 
remains proper when the underlying human rights violations “touch 
and concern” the United States.54 And although a more recent 
Supreme Court decision eliminated theories of corporate liability 
under the ATS, at least for foreign corporations,55 the ruling does not 
limit claims against individual corporate officers, directors, and 
employees who become involved in human rights violations (and 
whose interests also may diverge from the corporate lawyer’s).56 Civil 
liability can also exist in cases brought in overseas jurisdictions.57 
Regardless of forum, the prospect of personal liability creates 
additional conflicts of interest between lawyer and client that require 
withdrawal.58 (It is the divergence of legal interests between lawyer 
and client, rather than the nature or location of the forum in 
question, that gives rise to the conflict).59  
Lawyers also face bar discipline for violating human rights.60 Even 
if the lawyer escapes personal criminal or civil liability, the underlying 
violence and deprivations inherent in human rights violations 
constitute their own disciplinary violation.61 This creates a third layer 
 
54. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) 
(holding that cases must be dismissed unless the underlying facts “touch 
and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application [of the 
ATS].”). 
55. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, __U.S.__, 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018). 
56. Id. at 1405 (noting that “plaintiffs still can sue the individual corporate 
employees responsible for a violation of international law under the 
ATS.”) 
57. Such cases increasingly are being brought in Canada, for example. See, 
e.g., Sean E.D. Fairhurst & Zoë Thoms, Post-Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.: Is Canada Poised to Become an Alternative Jurisdiction 
for Extraterritorial Human Rights Litigation?, 52 ALTA L. REV. 389 
(2014) (discussing recent human rights cases brought by foreign 
nationals in Canada). 
58. See MODEL RULES r. 1.16(a)(1) (mandatory withdrawal if representation 
would result in an ethics violation). 
59. See MODEL RULES r. 1.7(a) (“A concurrent conflict of interest exists if . . 
. there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.”). 
60. See MODEL RULES r. 8.4(b) (criminal acts by the lawyer) and r. 8.4(a) 
(violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, arising out of violations of 
Rule 1.2(d) for counselling or assisting in criminal conduct by clients in 
violation of Rule 1.2(d) and/or representing a client despite a conflict of 
interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2)). 
61. Facilitating human rights violations based on discriminatory conduct, 
for example, most likely constitutes a disciplinary violation of its own, 
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of conflicts that cannot be cleared through client consent. Because 
such conduct in almost all cases is “prohibited by law,” the conflict 
per se cannot be resolved.62 It also seems clear that these scenarios 
present “a significant risk that the representation . . . would be 
materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer”63 that 
cannot be mitigated through informed consent by the client.64 Apart 
from this, one would think (or at least hope) that lawyers would 
regard serious human rights violations with such personal anathema 
that they could not reasonably conclude they could provide 
competent and diligent representation to clients who insist on directly 
pursuing (or indirectly causing) such ends. 65 
As a consequence of all of this, the corporate lawyer must 
withdraw from representation in the underlying transaction(s) in 
which such claims arise and probably must stop representing the 
corporate client entirely. All US jurisdictions prohibit lawyers from 
assisting in client crimes and require immediate withdrawal in such 
circumstances.66 Lawyers also must withdraw where continued 
representation would result in professional misconduct.67 Any lawyer 
who represents a client in such circumstances violates the ethical 
prohibition on representing clients with concurrent conflicts of 
interest. 
Separate from the question of what lawyers must do is the 
question of what they should do. The Model Rules allow withdrawal 
where prior legal work was unknowingly “tainted” by its connection 
to serious human rights violations68 or where the lawyer suspects such 
 
whether or not it also satisfies the elements of a criminal human rights 
violation. See MODEL RULES r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (“A lawyer who, in the course 
of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias 
or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, 
age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) 
when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). 
62. See MODEL RULES r. 1.7(b)(2) (lawyer may not represent a client if 
representation is “prohibited by law”).  
63. Id. at r. 1.7(a)(1). 
64. Id. at r. 1.7(b). 
65. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(1) (conflicts can be cleared only if “the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client”). 
66. See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak., Legal 
and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 
725, 783 nn. 225-226 (2004). 
67. See MODEL RULES r. 1.16(a)(1) (prohibiting representation that requires 
a lawyer to violate ethical rules or other laws). 
68. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(3) (for prior conduct, lawyer may withdraw where “the 
client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime . . . .”). 
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violations but does not “know” of them.69 In any case, human rights 
violations typically involve conduct that breaches the most 
fundamental canons of the social compact (e.g., those protecting 
human life and dignity). A corporate attorney faced with client 
conduct so fundamentally at odds with even the most basic levels of 
decency and humanity may overtly limit the scope of the 
representation to exclude it entirely.70 The duty to provide competent 
representation71 in and of itself requires a lawyer to point out that 
companies should avoid human rights violations whenever possible.72 
Lawyers faced with recalcitrant clients thus also should withdraw on 
the basis that “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement.”73 
B. Exceptions to Professional Secrecy 
The lawyer-client relationship includes special protections for 
communications (the attorney-client privilege),74 documentation (work 
product immunity),75 and other information relating to the 
representation.76 Lawyers must maintain a client’s confidences and 
employ reasonable measures to keep such information secret.77 The 
 
69. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(2) (lawyer may withdraw where “the client persists in a 
course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is criminal . . . .”). 
70. See MODEL RULES r. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may limit the scope of the 
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances 
and the client gives informed consent.”). 
71. See MODEL RULES r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
the representation.”). 
72. See MODEL RULES r. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”) (emphasis added). 
73. See MODEL RULES r. 1.16(b)(4); see also id. at r. 1.16(b)(7) (withdrawal 
where “other good cause” exists). 
74. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (recognizing 
corporate attorney-client privilege). 
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (heightened protection for attorney 
mental impressions and opinion work product). 
76. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 1.6(a) (broad protection covering 
“information relating to the representation of a client”). 
77. Id. at r. 1.6(c) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the 
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, 
information relating to the representation of a client.”). 
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duties of professional secrecy change markedly, however, when a 
lawyer becomes aware of either illegal or potentially injurious 
conduct.  
The most serious human rights violations amounting to 
international crimes probably warrant the application of the 
crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. This exception 
prevents the privilege from attaching to communications where a 
client seeks to further criminal ends through a lawyer’s services.78 As a 
consequence, neither lawyer nor client can assert the privilege to resist 
compelled testimony about the human rights violations in question. 
Similar principles may apply to remove the ordinarily-applicable 
protections provided by the attorney work product doctrine.79 Even 
violations that occurred long ago fall outside of the privilege and work 
product protections; statutes of limitation do not apply to 
international crimes80 (nor, for that matter, to lawyer discipline).81 
Both lawyer and client thus can be held to account for an unlimited 
temporal period. 
Even if such conduct technically fails to qualify as criminal at the 
international level,82 human rights violations nevertheless impact the 
 
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (outlining when attorney-client privilege does not 
apply); see also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) 
(recognizing crime/fraud exception to attorney-client privilege). 
79. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 
1994) (client waiver does not deprive attorney of work product 
protection, and vice versa), and In re Grand Jury, 211 F.Supp.2d 555, 
559 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (lawyer may continue to assert protection even if 
the client wants to waive it), with In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 
B.R. 247, 262 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (if client seeks waiver, lawyer 
may not assert factual work product protection but may for opinion 
work product). 
80. See, e.g., Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2931 (XXIII), 
Annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218, at art. 1 (Nov. 
11, 1970). 
81. See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 32 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“Proceedings under these rules shall be exempt 
from all statutes of limitations.”). The “[c]onduct of a lawyer, no matter 
when it has occurred, is always relevant to the question of fitness to 
practice . . . . Misconduct by a lawyer whenever it occurs reflects upon 
the lawyer’s fitness.”). Id. at cmt. (emphasis added). 
82. This could occur, for example, if the “chapeau” (contextual) elements of 
international crimes (armed conflict in the case of war crimes, a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civil population for crimes against 
humanity) are absent. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 38 at Arts. 7 
and 8 (defining crimes against humanity; stating the jurisdiction of the 
international criminal court in respect to war crimes). The underlying 
conduct – murder, torture, etc. – typically constitutes a domestic crime 
and violates an important human rights interest (life, bodily integrity, 
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lawyer’s confidentiality obligations in other ways. Under the Model 
Rules: “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer believes reasonably 
necessary . . . to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm . . . .”83 The policy underlying this exception is 
preventing harm and the “overriding value of life and physical 
integrity,” such that lawyers are allowed (but not required) 84 to 
disclose confidences even where the client is not responsible for the 
harm in question.85 This exception would apply to human rights 
violations because they involve highly injurious conduct, whether or 
not they also constitute “crimes.” Because Rule 1.6(b) allows but does 
not require disclosure, a decision to maintain confidence does not 
automatically call for discipline under the Model Rules.86 
In practice, however, the applicable standards vary widely by 
jurisdiction. Some states require disclosure based solely on the nature 
of the harm itself. The threatened injury need not be criminal, need 
not involve conduct by the client,87 and need not even be imminent.88 
 
etc.), thus justifying the application of the crime/fraud exception in any 
event. 
83. MODEL RULES r. 1.6(b)(1). The predecessor Model Code – which is still 
the basis of ethical regulation in some states – was broader and allowed 
counsel to disclose a client’s “intention . . . to commit a crime and the 
information necessary to prevent the crime.”  See MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT DR 4-101(C)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (allowing 
lawyers to reveal information given by client in order to prevent crime).  
84. See MODEL RULES r. 1.6 cmt. 6. 
85. An example could be a vendor, such as a private security company, who 
commits human rights violations while providing services on the client’s 
behalf. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(allegations of murder, forced labor, rape and torture committed against 
Burmese villagers by security forces during the construction of a gas 
pipeline in Burma).  
86. MODEL RULES r. 1.6 cmt. 15. 
87. See, e.g., WASH. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (requiring lawyer to 
disclose confidential information when the lawyer “reasonably believes” 
that disclosure is necessary to prevent “reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm.”). “Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if 
it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial 
threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer 
fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.” Id. at cmt. 6. 
88. MODEL RULES r. 1.6 cmt. 15 (for example, “… a lawyer who knows that 
a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town’s water 
supply must reveal this information to the authorities if there is a 
present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will 
contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer’s 
disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of 
victims.”). 
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Other states limit mandatory disclosures either to criminal conduct by 
the client89 or to cases involving imminent death or substantial bodily 
injury.90 A small number of jurisdictions focus on the lawyer’s 
certainty that a crime will occur, requiring reporting in clear cases91 
but granting discretion in others.92 Others even mandate that lawyers 
seek to dissuade the client before disclosure is required93 or 
permitted.94 
Limitations restricting disclosure to “criminal” conduct are 
strictly construed, even in cases of a highly injurious and imminent 
threat.95 The rules do not require a highly specific or absolute threat, 
however. Conduct generally posing a substantial risk to human life 
(e.g., arson) qualifies even if the instrumentality of injury does not 
guarantee that harm will occur.96 Although each case is fact-specific, 
lawyers may make reasonable inferences about the potential for injury 
 
89. See, e.g., VA. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.6(c)(1) (requiring disclosure of a 
client’s intent to commit a crime). 
90. See, e.g., IOWA R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 32:1.6(b)-(c) (requiring disclosure 
“to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary…to prevent 
imminent death or substantial bodily harm” but permitting disclosure 
where harm is threatened but not imminent). 
91. See, e.g., TEX. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.05(e) (“When a lawyer has 
confidential information clearly establishing that a client is likely to 
commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm to a person, the lawyer shall reveal confidential 
information to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to 
prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act.”). 
92. See, e.g., id. at r. 1.05(c)(7) (“A lawyer may reveal confidential 
information . . . [w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary 
to do so in order to prevent the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act.”). 
93. See, e.g., GA. R. PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3) (“Before using or 
disclosing [confidential information] . . . if feasible, the lawyer must 
make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if 
the client has already acted, to warn the victim.”). 
94. See, e.g., NEV. SUP. CT. R. 156(3)(a) (permitting disclosure only when 
the attorney’s services were used to further the crime or fraud and 
requiring the lawyer to attempt to persuade the client to take corrective 
action). 
95. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91-18, at 2-6 
(1991) (“…suicide clearly is an act involving ‘death or substantial bodily 
harm,’” but because it was not also a crime, “a strict literal reading of 
the confidentiality rule and its exceptions [led the board] to conclude 
that the attorney could not, under any circumstances, reveal his client’s 
intention to commit suicide”). 
96. See, e.g., Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. 
109, 110-11 & n.1 (1997) (no question as to ethical propriety of 
attorney’s disclosure where client threatened to burn down a building). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
A Human Rights Perspective 
205 
based on the facts as they understand them at the time.97 Gross 
human rights violations would almost certainly qualify as “criminal” 
conduct, such that the lawyer may (or even must) reveal information 
about the crimes.98 
Additional rules apply when corporate lawyers represent 
organizational clients (and they usually do). The client is the entity 
itself, not its individual officers, directors, or employees.99 Rule 1.13 
creates special reporting duties for lawyers who become aware that a 
corporate agent is breaching a duty to the organization, violating the 
law in a way that could be imputed to it, or engaging in other 
conduct likely to cause it harm.100 Causing the corporation to engage 
in or facilitate serious human rights violations almost certainly 
qualifies under all three provisions, such that counsel must “proceed 
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.”101 
At a minimum, the lawyer must report human rights violations to 
senior corporate officials.102 If upward reporting proves ineffective,103 
the corporate lawyer has a difficult choice to make. If the human 
rights violations present a reasonably certain threat of substantial 
injury to the corporation that amounts to a clear violation of law, 
Rule 1.13(c) permits the lawyer to report outside the organization to 
 
97. See, e.g., McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(because lawyer reasonably believed that disclosure of location of 
kidnapped children that lawyer thought were still alive – but who 
turned out to be killed by client, along with client’s wife – was necessary 
in order to prevent imminent loss of life or substantially bodily harm, 
lawyer’s conduct “did not violate the duty of confidentiality in a manner 
that rendered his assistance constitutionally ineffective.”). 
98. Special rules also require lawyers to disclose confidences to prevent or 
rectify fraud on a tribunal, but because legal practice in the dispute 
resolution context is not addressed here, these rules are not discussed 
further. See MODEL RULES r. 3.3(b) (duty of candor toward the tribunal 
and obligation to disclose to remediate criminal or fraudulent conduct 
relating to a legal proceeding). 
99. See MODEL RULES r. 1.13(a). 
100. Id. at r. 1.13(b). 
101. Id. 
102. Lawyers must continue to “report up” all the way to the board of 
directors, if circumstances require. See MODEL RULES r. 1.13 cmt. 5 
(requiring attorneys to refer the matter to a higher authority when 
reasonably necessary to “enable the organization to address the matter 
in a timely and appropriate manner”). 
103. Ineffectiveness here means that the “highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and 
appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a 
violation of law…” See MODEL RULES r. 1.13(c)(1). 
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the extent necessary to prevent substantial injury to it.104 When 
corporate lawyers represent a publicly-traded company, additional 
“up the ladder” reporting duties and disclosure options apply under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.105 These duties are triggered by a material 
violation of a federal or state securities law – for example, a corporate 
client concealing human rights violations (and the liability risks they 
entail) and/or deceptively mischaracterizing the nature of its overseas 
conduct, partnerships, etc. in financial reports.106 
C. Ethical Risks Created by Other Lawyers 
Corporate lawyers rarely act alone, and another area of ethical 
risk exists for lawyers who fail to properly address misconduct by 
others. Counsel cannot sit idly by after witnessing misconduct by 
other attorneys. Even misconduct that a corporate lawyer simply 
learns about can create a duty to report the behavior – even when no 
supervisory or other transactional relationship exists. As the front line 
of enforcement in a self-governing profession, the Model Rules require 
the reporting of other lawyers whenever their conduct “raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects . . . .”107 Human rights violations 
certainly reflect on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law, and legal 
counsel’s involvement in them thus must be reported. A knowing 
failure to report itself constitutes misconduct.108 Lawyers are honor 
bound to police their colleagues and face serious consequences when 
they fail to do so. 
Other self-regulating duties contemplate a pre-existing 
relationship between lawyers. This usually involves lawyers practicing 
 
104. Id. at r. 1.13(c) (providing that a lawyer “may reveal [confidential] 
information” but is not required to). 
105. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and 
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2005) (requiring attorneys to comply with additional 
reporting standards in instances of material violations); see also 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 
784 (requiring the SEC to promulgate a rule setting forth “minimum 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers”).  
106. Lawyers who become involved in facilitating corporate falsehoods (eg, 
by preparing or reviewing inaccurate financial reports) also are subject 
to bar discipline for engaging in deceptive conduct. See MODEL RULES r. 
7.1 (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”). 
107. See MODEL RULES r. 8.3(a). There is an exception from reporting where 
the grounds for the report are confidential. Id. at r. 8.3(c) (excluding 
otherwise confidential information or information gained through 
participation in a “lawyer’s assistance program”). 
108. See MODEL RULES r. 8.4(a) (failing to report is misconduct). 
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together in one law firm or corporate legal department. Model Rule 
5.1 imposes structural obligations when lawyers work together in such 
collectives:  
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or 
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial 
authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
Ethical responsibility extends both horizontally and vertically. 
Rule 5.1(a) focuses on the collective duty of managerial lawyers to 
put into place systems – appropriate for their particular organization 
– designed to ensure that all of the organization’s lawyers (peers as 
well as subordinates) meet their ethical obligations.109 Discipline flows 
from the failure to put appropriate mechanisms in place, regardless of 
whether an ethical breach by another lawyer actually occurs. The lack 
of systems, or unreasonable systems, is enough.  
The Model Rules also impose individual supervisory duties, such 
that a lawyer with “direct supervisory authority over another lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”110 Managerial and supervisory 
lawyers also face liability for ordering disciplinable conduct in the first 
place or for knowingly ratifying it after the fact.111 All three 
obligations apply in similar fashion with respect to non-lawyer staff 
(e.g., paralegals, foreign legal consultants, etc.), although the 
supervisory standards themselves are somewhat different.112 
These provisions should give corporate lawyers considerable 
pause. A rogue lawyer overseas implicated in human rights violations 
could subject American corporate counsel to ethical liability within 
the United States, not only for insufficient supervision, but also for 
 
109. See MODEL RULES r. 5.1(a); see also Matter of Farmer, 263 Kan. 531, 
537 (1997) (imposing discipline for hiring inexperienced lawyers to 
provide bankruptcy services in auxiliary offices but failing to supervise, 
train, educate, or mentor them, as well as failing to review junior 
attorneys’ work). 
110. MODEL RULES r. 5.1(b). 
111. Id. at r. 5.1(c)(1). 
112. See MODEL RULES r. 5.3(a) (structural obligation), 5.3(b) (supervisory 
obligation), and 5.3(c) (imputation of violations to lawyer). This is 
particularly important with respect to supervisees located outside the 
firm or legal department (e.g., non-lawyers assistants located overseas); 
see also id. at r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (“When using such services outside the firm, 
a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are 
provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional 
obligations.”). 
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failing to have sufficient structures and procedures in place to detect 
and redress ethical wrongdoing. 
A related issue arises on the other side of the relationship – that 
of the legal supervisee – when a non-US lawyer supervises a junior 
lawyer admitted in the US in a foreign law firm or corporation. 
American lawyers working abroad still must comply with the ethical 
obligations of the US jurisdiction(s) in which they are admitted.113 
Within this context, the Model Rules normally provide a “safe 
harbor” for junior lawyers confronted with ethical issues. Although 
junior lawyers must exercise independent judgment and are not 
shielded simply because they were directed to engage in unethical 
conduct,114 when reasonable minds can differ on what the ethical rules 
require, junior lawyers may rely on a reasonable interpretation by 
supervisory counsel.115 
That said, it remains unclear whether an American lawyer can 
rely on a reasonable resolution of an ethical issue relating to human 
rights by a senior practitioner when the senior lawyer is not admitted 
in an American jurisdiction. An overseas senior lawyer’s qualifications 
to resolve an ethical issue under US law may be difficult to establish. 
In other nations, “legal” work may or may not be performed by 
individuals considered “lawyers” in the American sense. Some 
countries (e.g., Japan, with its 2% bar passage rate)116 recognize only 
a small fraction of legal service providers as lawyers, such that many 
legal transactions are handled by individuals who are not regarded as 
official members of the bar. Many foreign jurisdictions also distinguish 
lawyers via their functional categories, creating regulatory 
requirements that differ between lawyers who appear in court, counsel 
who prepare pleadings, attorneys who prepare wills, corporate 
 
113. See MODEL RULES r. 8.5(a) (“A lawyer admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, 
regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.”). 
114. See MODEL RULES r. 5.2(a) (“A lawyer is bound by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the 
direction of another person.”). 
115. Id. at r. 5.2(b) (“A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a 
supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.”). 
116. See Thomas Flannigan, Opening Up Japan to American Lawyers, Japan 
Policy Research Institute Critique, Vol. II, No. 9 (Oct 1995) available at 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_II_9.html 
[https://perma.cc/T8ZW-UJDX] (describing 2% admission rate and 
“the mother of all bar exams” which also requires all test takers to 
demonstrate perfect fluency in Japanese). 
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charters, and contracts, and practitioners who provide business and 
taxation advice.117 
Putting aside recent proposals to expand practice by foreign 
lawyers in the United States,118 admission procedures vary widely by 
jurisdiction. Some states treat foreign “lawyers” as admitted even 
when they are not members of that state’s bar, either in the context 
of pro hac vice permission, as a special privilege for in-house counsel, 
or pursuant to limited practice rules.119 It thus can be hard to tell if a 
given foreign lawyer even qualifies as such in the United States, 
especially if the representation in question is not anchored in court 
proceedings. Given the wide differences even among American states 
on ethical matters, let alone between countries with entirely different 
legal systems, reliance on non-admitted lawyers might be 
unreasonable per se.120  
Apart from such formal categorization, other important 
differences exist in what might be described as lawyer temperament. 
Legal practice in the United States is characterized as entrepreneurial 
and proactive in its mixture of legal problem solving with business 
and legal counseling.121 The U.S. approach contrasts sharply with that 
 
117. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know about the 
Civil Law System, 1998 PROF. LAW. 37, 40-42 (1998) (distinguishing 
between lawyers who appear before court in adversarial roles and 
lawyers who draft, certify, and store documents). 
118. See ABA Comm. on Ethics 20/20 Proposal, Model Rule 5.5 and Foreign 
Lawyers (Sept. 19, 2011) (proposals to extend the registration of in-
house counsel rules to include foreign lawyers and to allow foreign 
lawyers to apply to practice pro hac vice in conjunction with local 
counsel).  
119. See MODEL RULES r. 5.5(c), 5.5(d). Other rules treat foreign lawyers as 
“admitted” in order to exercise of the full range of disciplinary sanctions 
over lawyers who provide or offer legal services in that state, whether or 
not they have permission from the bar regulators to do so. See MODEL 
RULES r. 8.5(a) (foreign lawyers providing “any legal services” in the 
United States are subject to discipline under the Model Rules). This is a 
sensible approach for disciplinary jurisdiction but is unhelpful here for 
purposes of Rules 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.  
120. In an opinion relating to the outsourcing of legal work to overseas 
lawyers, the ABA noted that it may be necessary to treat overseas 
counsel as a non-lawyer in order to comply with the applicable ethical 
rules. See A.B.A. Op. 08-451, Lawyer’s Obligations When Outsourcing 
Legal and Nonlegal Support Services, at 4 (Aug. 5, 2008) (noting that 
“…it will be more important than ever for the outsourcing lawyer to 
scrutinize the work done by the foreign lawyers – perhaps viewing them 
as non-lawyers – before relying upon their work in rendering legal 
services to the client.”).  
121. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in 
Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 
46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1068 (1997) (describing lawyers in the United 
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of many foreign jurisdictions, where legal practice “is more formal and 
stylized” and legal counsel “practice decision consulting, not legal risk 
analysis.”122 These differences cut both ways. On one hand, the more 
deeply embedded a lawyer is in the corporate processes leading to the 
violation, the more likely counsel is to be culpable when those 
corporate dealings perpetrate or otherwise facilitate a human rights 
violation. On the other, the more a lawyer comes from a culture 
where the client rules the roost and lawyers simply do as they are 
told, the more likely the lawyer is to create ethical liability by 
omission. 
With corporate activity and attendant human rights violations 
potentially touching multiple states and/or foreign jurisdictions, 
additional complications immediately arise in determining which 
jurisdiction’s ethical rules and limited admission requirements apply 
to these questions. Clearly all concerned have an interest in getting 
the answers right. The ethical implications of potentially serious 
human rights violations are exactly the kind of high stakes issue that 
requires “a consistent course of action or position”123 among 
practitioners working together. Yet the resolution of such questions in 
the transnational context involves evaluating interlocking 
determinations of “reasonableness” in terms of: (i) what law governs 
the ethical question in the first place;124 (ii) whether a foreign attorney 
qualifies as a “lawyer” with a duty to report ethical breaches under 
Rule 8.3125 as well as whether counsel qualifies as a “senior lawyer”126 
upon whom a junior lawyer may rely under Rule 5.2; and (iii) both 
structural and individual supervisory obligations relating to junior 
 
States as mixing “business and legal counseling with little concern for 
the boundaries between them.”). 
122. See id. at 1077-78 (explaining that foreign legal systems do not share 
this “proactive” model); see also id. at 1073 (noting that “[t]he 
enthusiasm with which U.S. business lawyers . . . embrace the proactive 
model of lawyering stands in sharp contrast to its absence in other legal 
systems.”).  
123. See MODEL RULES r. 5.2 (recognizing that supervising attorneys must 
“assume responsibility” for a decision for there to be any course of 
action). 
124. This involves choice of law questions governed by Rule 8.5 as well as the 
application of the safe harbor protection in Rule 8.5(b)(2). See MODEL 
RULES r. 8.5 (the safe harbor protects lawyers from discipline if the 
lawyer’s conduct conforms to the jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
reasonably believes the “predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will 
occur.”). 
125. See MODEL RULES r. 8.3(a) (reporting duty). 
126. See MODEL RULES r. 5.2 cmt. 2 (subordinate lawyer’s reliance on 
supervisory lawyer). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
A Human Rights Perspective 
211 
lawyers and non-lawyer assistants.127 Ironically, these are exactly the 
kind of difficult questions about which reasonable legal minds can 
differ (and about which junior lawyers could most use guidance from 
senior counsel). 
IV. Concluding Thoughts 
International human rights law can have a surprisingly important 
impact on the relationship between lawyer and corporate client. 
Counsel must be sufficiently skilled to recognize the wide potential 
scope of human rights accountability in the corporate context (MR 
1.1). Lawyers must not counsel or assist clients in criminal conduct 
(e.g., any human rights violation involving violence or serious rights 
deprivations) (MR 1.2). They must timely and properly communicate 
to clients the legal risks involved, how to avoid liability, and how 
these (and many other) limitations necessarily impact the scope of the 
legal representation at issue (MR 1.4). 
When such conduct occurs, however, exceptions to confidentiality 
rules may permit or even require disclosing client secrets in order to 
prevent the crimes and/or harm arising from them (MR 1.6). Actual 
or potential rules violations also raise the specter of a variety of 
conflicts of interest (MR 1.7). Because they are difficult to resolve, 
even with client consent, conflicts of interest arising out of human 
rights violations normally will require counsel to withdraw from the 
representation, or at the very least permit the lawyer to do so. (MR 
1.16). 
Because corporate attorneys rarely act alone, the impact on the 
lawyer’s relationships with other lawyers also must be considered. 
Counsel must properly supervise fellow lawyers (MR 5.1, 5.3) and 
ultimately must report lawyer malfeasance to the appropriate 
disciplinary authorities (MR 8.3). Lawyers who provide assistance in a 
client’s crimes or who fail to meet all of the ethical requirements 
noted above face a full range of disciplinary sanctions for this 
misconduct, up to and including disbarment (MR 8.4). 
None of this is easy to sort out because the lawyer’s ethical 
obligations are layered on top of the other criminal, civil, and 
regulatory systems that apply to the company and industry in 
question. The upshot is that lawyers may be restricted in a way that 
other corporate actors (whether C-Suite executives, divisional 
managers, or functional / operational employees) are not. Lawyers 
must hold themselves to a higher standard, however, and ensure that 
they meet their ethical obligations. If they fail to do so, they are 
 
127. See MODEL RULES r. 5.1 (detailing structural obligations of law firm 
partners and “other lawyers possess[ing] comparable managerial 
authority” to supervise lawyers); see also MODEL RULES r. 5.3 (detailing 
obligations with respect to non-lawyer assistants).  
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deviating from the standard of appropriate corporate representation in 
the global setting and exposing themselves to malpractice liability and 
disciplinary sanctions. 
A final point is that neither human rights nor the ethical risks 
they create are static considerations. Continual re-assessment is 
necessary, particularly where the business representation in question 
is linked to an unstable geo-political environment. Corporate lawyers 
must proactively analyze not only how such developments affect their 
business clients, but also how these shifts impact themselves, their 
colleagues, and the ethical standards they have pledged to uphold as 
legal professionals. 
 
